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Abstract
This chapter explores themes of race’, class, gender and identity in the social and political identifications of Muslim boys in England against the background of an increasing public, policy and academic focus on religious identities. Drawing on data collected as part of a wider study that explores the educational impact of the ‘war on terror’, I draw attention to a range of strategies that the boys draw on to deal with their schooling and local neighbourhood. The data suggests a strategic take up of Muslim   of a global community focussed, Muslim identity to counter the dominant discourses on the ‘war on terror’. However, in the context of schooling, a ‘tough’ Asian male peer group identity was constructed in relation to the classed, gendered and racialised order of schooling. In the context of locality and neighbourhood e specific area – based masculinities cross-cut ethnic, religious and national ties and identities. As the boys’ accounts reveal, these area-based identities were produced and contested in articulation with local histories. This was both in the context of local white working class neighbourhood struggles and Asian cultural and political struggles against far-right extremism and racism.   At the same time these area-based identities were strongly gendered and I also discuss in this chapter, the demarcation of girls as symbolic markers of racialised boundaries in the masculine struggles over space and territory.  

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the impact of racism on the lives and schooling of Muslim youth against the backcloth of debates about the politicisation of Muslim identities. Since the mid to late 1980s, against the background of broader economic and social changes at a global level, there has an increasing focus on religious identities. In the UK, the Rushdie affair​[1]​ sparked fierce debate about the (in) compatibility of Muslim cultures with Western values and about the extent to which Muslims could be integrated into British Society. Such debates spiralled out of control when the London bombings in July 2005 were connected to ‘home-grown’ terrorism. Since then, Muslim youth, especially Muslim boys and young men have come under unprecedented scrutiny and surveillance with debate about Islamic radicalization and ‘extremism’ dominating media, policy and academic discussion. A group that was once regarded as passive and law-abiding especially when compared with their African-Caribbean counterparts has since the late 1980s been firmly recast in the public imagination as violent, dangerous and a threat to the social order. While statistics (DfES, 2007) show them to be among the ‘losers’ in the achievement game, Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys have not been the focus of concerns about underachievement in the same way that  boys in general have. Instead, discourses of ‘self-segregation’ (Cantle, 2001; Ousley, 2001; Denham, 2002) and global (in)security posed by the ‘war on terror’ currently position  them as ‘at risk’ of either violent criminality  (drugs and or gangs) or terrorism and extremism. These dominant representations are gendered with boys constructed as radicalised and girls and young women the victims of symbols of that radicalisation.  Not only do such representations deny agency to Muslim youth who are assumed to be too readily and easily brainwashed into violent idelogies but such representations also rely on produce an over-emphasis on religious and culturalist reading of Muslim experiences and identities. This is despite the wealth of critical sociological research emphasising complexity in the identity work and ‘lived’ experiences of  ethnic minority young people.   

 This chapter draws on data from a wider study (Shain, 2011)  exploring the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on the educational identities of Muslim boys to offer an alternative reading of their social and political identifications.  In the first section I briefly review recent policy and academic debates that focus on the apparent radicalisation of Muslim youth. Int eh second section I move on to locate my own theoretical framework for analysing Muslim boys’ experiences in the context of    recent theorising on youth identities. The third section outlines the wider study and reports on data drawn from that study to challenge dominant representations that over-emphasise the role of religion and culture in readings of Muslim youth experiences. I focus instead on I intersections of ‘race’, religion, gender and class in the boys’ strategic take-up of identities in the context of their local schooling and neighbourhood experiences.   

Background: analysing the ‘turn to religion’ 
Since the 1990s, empirical research on second and third generation British south Asians has noted an increasing tendency among British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to assert Muslim identities (Werbner, 1996, Eade, 1990; 1994;  Samad 1998; Saeed et al,  1999; Archer, 2003; Ramji, 2007).  The Rushdie Affair was a major turning point for British Muslims not only in terms of the re-categorisations of various ethnic (Mirpuri, Bangladeshi, Pakistani) groups into religious (Muslim) ones that it invoked, but, also because it occurred around the same time as other protests involving Muslim youth in Europe's inner cities.​[2]​ Such protests were read to signal the emergence of radicalisation of Muslim youth across the landscape of Europe and beyond, representing a generalised threat to western democratic ideals.
Earlier sociological accounts focussing on the political mobilisations around the Rushdie affair tied this ‘turn to religion’ to class factors rather than an increase in religiosity. Samad (1992) for example, suggested that the anti-Rushdie protests which brought young Muslim men in Bradford to the fore centred on rights claims in the face of ongoing material disadvantage and aggravated racialised tensions. Modood (1992) also suggested that the demonstrations symbolised working class anger and hurt pride. His explanation for this anger taking a religious outlet focused on the abandonment of young people by a secular intelligentsia which did not understand or feel responsible for its own working class. Glynn (2002: 977) on the other hand argues, 'there is certainly a vacuum and a lack of secular leadership but that vacuum is not due to the absence of a middle-class which would hardly be expected to breech the gap of class experience'. Like Nira Yuval Davis  (1992 she identifies  the ‘turn to religion’ as  a consequence of the demise of socialism linked with the collapse of the former eastern bloc. She argues that when socialism is not thought to be able to offer a way out working class anger will turn to other movements.   Nira Yuval Davis for example  argued that  'in the third world, and among third world minorities in the west, the rise of fundamentalism is intimately linked with the failure of nationalist and socialist movements to bring successful liberation from oppression, exploitation and poverty (Yuval-Davis 1992, p280),   
Since the London bombings in July 2005, policy and academic debate has intensified around a focus on Islamic radicalisation  (Glees and Pope 2005; Leppard and Fielding, 2005; Spalek, 2007;  Abbas, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; Buijs et al, 2006). Although recent debates in the aftermath of the London bombings continue to recognise the significance of structural factors included wider material interests that have driven US British coalition’s foreign policy agendas (Spalek, 2007; Abbass, 2007; Choudhury, 2007), there has also, been a tendency to focus [over focus on relfion – radicalisation and extremism in research, policy and political agendas - on individual perceptions and to draw on culturalist arguments to explain religious identifications.  For example, For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, Tony Blair made explicit links between the bombings and attendance at Madrassas. Elsewhere debate and discussion has focussed on ‘mad mullahs’, and radical Islamists  waiting to  pounce on individual boys experiencing identity crisis (Choudhury, 2007; Leppard and Fielding 2005; Glees and Pope 2005).  A series of mitigating factors have been identified as significant tint eh ‘supposed radicalisation of young Muslim men – policy and political debates have positioned young Muslim men as prone to radicalisation and girls and women as the symbols of that radicalisation. In the next section I outline an aletenrative framework .....

Theorising identities: ‘race’, class and gender in articulation  
As Peach (2005) has noted,  British discourse on minorities has shifted from ‘ace’ in the 1960s to ethnicity in the 1970s and most recently since the 1990s to religion. However a constant theme has been the overemphasis on culture and pathological accounts of ethnic minorities in policy and academic literature.   Since the 1980s, sociologists of youth and education (Connolly, 1998, Mirza, 1992; Haw, 1994; Basit, 1997;  Dwyer, 2000;  Archer, 2003;  Shain, 2003) have challenged the fixed and static conceptions of culture found in culture clash frameworks that positioned ethnic minorities as passive victims, caught between two cultures (Watson, 1977) . Alternative theoretical frameworks drawn from neo-Marxist, postcolonial and poststructuralist theorising   (Hall 1980; 1992; 1996; Brah and Minhas, 1986; Brah,  1996;  Bhavnani and Phoenix, 1994) have been applied, to argue for a focus on the complex reality of the ‘lived’ experiences of young people. In these alternative accounts, young people’s identities are read as multiple, constantly negotiated and always in process (Hall, 1992:1996) . Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of articulation such theorisations instead emphasise the complex interrelationship between capitalist, patriarchal and  imperialist relations as structures of power shaping the experiences of young people in particular social and historical formations.  
In education, feminist theorising on ‘race’ has emphasised the significance of these structures in shaping, for example, Eurocentric formulations of curriculum and achievement that have historically positioned black students, especially girls underachievers who ‘lack’ self-esteem  (Mirza 1992).   Mirza challenged such culturalist explanations suggesting that the black girls in her study were not lacking in self esteem for the educational achievements of the black girls in her study.  She found that the families of the girls she studied played a significant role in compensating for  Eurocentric and racist assumptions embedded in education and the labour markets. Contrary to dominant stereotypes of black youth as underachievers, the girls in her study were academically successful. However, racism in the labour market was a significant factor in reproducing their disadvantaged social situations. 
Recent research on Muslim and Asian girls  (Dwyer 2000, Archer 2003, Shain 2003, Bhopal 2010) has  also focussed  on the more active role played by British-born Asian and Muslim youth in negotiating identities drawn from both residual ‘home’ cultures and the local cultures they currently inhabit. These feminist researchers have also challenged earlier additive and double and triple subordination theories – drawing on   intersectionality – or an agency within structural limits approach. 
Claire Dwyer (1999), for example, challenged dominant representations of Muslim girls as oppressed victims of backward Muslim cultures. She focussed instead on the active roles played by Muslim women in negotiating their identities in relation to a complex network of peer, teacher family and neighbourhood relations. Her research suggested ongoing contestations over Muslim femininity within a range of conflicting racialised and gendered assumptions about female labour, work  employment,, the upholding of collective Muslim honour and classed school cultures and career expectations . Girls in archer’s research ( 1998) also engaged in lengthy debates about what it means to be a ‘proper Muslim and what might constitute  respectable or appropriate Muslim  femininity. Non o f these meanings were fixed ; they were eal subject to ongoing debate and challenge. Challenged notions of traditional western dichotomy   
The theoretical approach that I drew on in my analysis of Muslim boys’ identities (Shain 2011), continued within this framework identifying structures of ‘race’, gender and class as cross-cutting and produced in articulation, that is in the intersection of their everyday lives with relations of domination and subordination (Rutherford, 1990).  This theoretical approach recognises that people are located in material contexts which provide constraints and structure the limits of possibilities for agency and action. In relation to Muslim boys, this entails recognition of the historical forces of colonialism and imperialism in shaping the classed locations and settlement patterns of Muslim communities in areas of England that have subsequently suffered the most from economic decline. These settlement patterns have had a lasting legacy in terms of the types of schooling and educational and employment opportunities.  By most economic measures, Muslims, especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are the poorest and most disadvantaged of the ethnic minority communities living in England.  For example, Pakistani men are twice as likely and Bangladeshi men are three times more likely to be unemployed compared to white men. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are four times more likely than white women to be jobless (ONS, 2006).  Seventy percent of Bangladeshi pupils and 60 percent of Pakistani pupils live in the 20 per cent most deprived postcode areas (DfES, 2009) and this contributes to continued material disadvantage as they enter and progress through schooling.  
These poorer disadvantaged working class Muslim communities  have also been subject to dominant racialised and classed,  cultural definitions of them as ‘lacking’, ‘deficient’ and as responsible for their own marginality (Alexander, 2004).  Discourses of integration emerging out of the official responses to the 2001 inner city disturbances,  positioned Muslim communities as ‘insular’ and isolationist. For example, despite the fact that all the wards in which rioting took place scored highly among the most deprived in the country, the official reports focussed heavily on culturalist  explanations of the violent outbreaks.  The Bradford   Ousely Report warned for example,  of ‘the growing threat of self-segregation’ of the city’s diverse ethnic communities (Ousley 2001) suggesting that residential segregation was a matter of choice. Such arguments ignore racism in housing policies and the widespread material disadvantage nad raiclise dtensions that may impact on to live to together to avoid racist harassment. Further, the official reports framed the riots through a discourse  of  ‘parallel lives’ which meant  ‘[s]separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives’ (Cantle 2001, p.9). It was argued that this parallel living had led to widespread ignorance of ‘others’. The Cantle report, for example, characterised racism as the ‘natural’ result of ignorance or lack of knowledge about others. ‘[T]there is little wonder that ignorance about each others’ communities can easily grow into fear; especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to undermine community harmony and foster division’ (2001, p 9) 
In the aftermath of the inner city disturbances, political statements such as those made by David Blunkett also powerfully depicted Muslim communities as insular and  ‘refusing to integrate’. Blunkett suggested that Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were responsible for their own marginality- mothers by not learning English ,  the family and elders once commended for strong discipline now condemned for not being able to control boys but at the same time apparently over –controlling girls (shain, 2003). 
Arguments about integration have, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, intersected with discourses of the ‘war on terror’  to position   Muslim boys have as dangerous, suspect and vulnerable (to extremism) and as a threat to mythic ‘british way of life’.  Boys and young men have been constructed by these policy discourses as ‘politically alienated’  which as   Alexander (2004) suggests is a code for  ‘at risk’ of radicalisation. Girls and women have been constructed  as the symbols of this radicalisation. 
However, these dominant cultural readings of Muslim boys are  hegemonic (Gramsci, 1971) – dominant but constantly being challenged in and through schooling and local contexts, sometimes in ways that may reinforce dominant stereotypes  of violent masculinity as they were in the ‘riots’ in 2001 and in masculine protections of naighbourhoods.  Schooling is an important mediator of dominant relations of power and cultural definitions where these are worked out, contested, challenged, reinforced though the boys’ own strategies and by external definitions of them. 
Drawing on the  Gramscian concept of articulation developed by post colonial readings of identities,  I see Muslim boys’ identities  as produced  through an ongoing negotiation between internal and external definitions of identities or 'modes of being' (Brah 1996). External or objective definitions derive from complex interrelationships between various structural factors (race, religion, class and gender) in particular local, social and historical contexts and internal to the young people's subjective experiences of these situations.  Adopting this approach to identities  means that different  boys may subjectively experience their current locations in different ways depending on the ways in which they are positioned and position themselves in relation to dominant discourses. According to Davies and Harre,  
Positioning is the discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observable and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines; there can be interactive positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there can be reflexive positioning in which what one person positions oneself (Davis and Harre  (1998:48). 
Performing Muslim masculinities 
In contrast to dominant representations of Muslim boys as disaffected and ‘at risk’ of radicalisation – a thesis supported in the radicalisation theories cited above, recent sociological research suggests that Muslim boys and young men may strategically take - up (Archer, 2003)  or reject ( Hopkins 2007; 2005) Muslim identities to challenge dominant stereotypes of weak Asian passivity (Archer, 2003). At the same time they may make investments in Islamic cultural capital to support bids for patriarchal power in the face of declining economic capital (Dwyer, 1999; Macey, 1999; Ramji 2007; Hopkins 2005). Such research draws on the concept of multiple and relational masculinities (Connell, 1987; 1995) that are embedded in institutional practices and also embodied in gender practices (Swain, 2002). Masculinity is conceptualised as multiple, constantly repositioned and contested in ongoing performances. The hegemonic form of masculinity (Connell, 1997, 1995) is often underwritten by violence, though it may not always  be the most common type on view. The fact that many boys are enticed into fitting into and conforming to the demands of idealised, culturally exalted forms of masculinity suggests that hegemony works by consent (Swain, 2002). Thus, masculinities are simultaneously constructed in relation to boys’ classed locations (prospect of unemployment) patriarchy (dominance over women) and racism (Islamaphobia in the policy and media discourses and anti-Muslim racism on the ground).
Louise Archer  (2003) drew on  discussion group interviews with 31 Muslim boys aged 14-15 in a northern mill town.  Drawing on feminist poststructuralism and a discourse analytic approach, she argues that the boys take-up a range of masculinities in different contexts. For example, Muslim identities were drawn on to resist notions of ‘weak’ Asian masculinity. However, patriarchal Asian identities were drawn on in relation to gender and the boys’ assertions of their privilege. In the context of local identities the boys in Archer’s study drew on popular black cultural forms represented through ‘gangsta’ masculinities. Archer (2003:50) argues, for example that:
 The boys’ construction of a ‘strong Muslim brotherhood might be usefully read in terms of intertwining of racial and patriarchal themes, through which boys resist popular stereotypes of weak and passive Asian masculinity, the boys identifications could be seen as straightforwardly challenging this stereotype , replacing it with an alternative association of Muslim masculinity with strength. The boys association between Muslim identity, unity and strength challenge contemporary western ideals of individualistic white masculinity and elsewhere. The boys differentiated between a strong, collective  Muslim families and unstable highly individualistic  dualistic western white family structure 

Hopkins (2005; 2007) conducted focus group discussions and individual interviews with 55  young Muslim men aged 16-25 in Scotland.  He  also found that his respondents took up a range of identity positions moving between different intersecting scales, sometimes asserting their identities as ‘local’ through neighbourhood relations and as ‘nationalists  though a strong appeals to Scottish nationalism. At other times they drew on, but in some cases, also rejected, global Muslim identities through spiritual connections to the umma, (a global Muslim brotherhood).  Hopkins suggested that the young men’s identifications were also contradictory  in that they simultaneously argued that men and women are equal in Islam, whilst advocating sexist stereotypes about their expectations of Muslim women. Hopkins refers to this as ‘sexist equality’   and sees it as supporting Linda Mcdowell’s (2002:115) young men’s masculinities are constructed around a belief in ‘domestic conformity’ whereby young men focus on earning wages and reproducing sexist and heterosexual familial situations. 
Dwyer (2000:479) and Ramji (2007) also note  that this policing by the young men appeared to be a means by which their own adolescent masculine, ethnic and religious identity could be maintained. Ramji (2007) drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of   capital an field, argued in relation to her study of Muslim men and women, that  religion was a particularly important source of gaining status especially when  access to other eg economic capital was limited because of racism and prejudice.  She argues that young men’s investments in Islamic cultural capital were a reaction to the growing educational divide between themselves and Muslim women. Class seemed to influence how this was voiced. Working-class Muslim men in her study had less access to economic capital and so relied on religion to give them access to a cultural capital, which could then be converted to other capital such as social, or indeed economic if it created a situation where only men are allowed to work. 
The complex catalogue of shifting and strategic identifications suggested by these studies of young Muslim men suggests a need to move beyond prevailing discourses of Asian gangs (Alexander, 2000)  as well as popular and academic theorisations of radicalisation which position Muslim boys as disaffected from their local cultures and processes of local democracy.
In the next section I explore some of the ways in which  the boys in my research study were able to take up and position themselves in relation to dominant discourses of schooling and cultural definitions of them as newly dangerous and suspect in the context of the ‘war on terror’.
The Muslim boys’ project 
The research was conducted between May 2002 and October 2003 in Oldwych in the west midlands and consisted of group and individual interviews with 24 working class Muslim boys aged 12-18. At the time of the research, Oldwych had a population of around 250.000. The proportion of ethnic minorities was around six per cent including Irish but around eight per cent for under 16s. Ethnic minorities were overwhelmingly concentrated in two wards, Newtown and Belstone where they accounted for almost 50 per cent of the population. Like many of the wards in the northern towns, these areas were also severely economically deprived with higher than average numbers of children claiming free school meals and high rates of unemployment. Newtown also had significant concentration of asylum-seekers, which had been a focal concern of British National Party organisation in the wider city.  
Fieldwork was conducted across two sites. The first was a youth group located in Newtown where boys met once a week. The second was a mixed comprehensive secondary school   Leyton High, which was located on the border of Newtown serving young people, aged 11-16.  Of the 24 boys, seventeen were Pakistani including one who described himself mixed-race white English and Pakistani, four were Bengali, two were Afghani and one was Turkish.  Yacoub, a Newtown youth worker described himself as British Pakistani.
Global politics
The interviews with the boys focused on a range of themes including their  experiences of family, neighbourhood and schooling. However,  because of the timing of the research, global politics emerged as a strong theme across the interviews. There was strong agreement across the interviews that September 11 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ had significantly impacted on both school and community  life.  The following comments were typical of many expressed:
  
... thing is they started thinking , since, since like that incident happened September the 11th . They think all Muslims are terrorists when they haven't even got evidence that it was him (Bin Laden). They're just accusing him because they're scared of him. (Arshad)
***
	They started being more sickening in their attitudes towards Asian people they look at every other Asian as a terrorist…they judge the whole crowd by …they judge the majority by the minority. [Before Sept 11th ], it was bad but not that bad. That just triggered it. They didn't used to call us terrorists then they used to call us Pakis. (Shahid) 
***
People are really sceptical about this whole thing thinking there's justification for them to kill Muslims if they suspect that ..they can suspect what they want…it's like a different day, a different era . And as much as the people have been discussing Sept 11, it has had a massive impact on the community. We've had a lot of how can you put it.. from the white community ..Some really ignorant comments.. Like oh I wonder what it would be like  ‘you couldn't really go on holiday now could you?’ Because we look like terrorists. [to them]…That’s the sort of stupid thing they're saying. Whatever they've been fed by the press that's what they've been repeating. Because they’re white they class themselves as being the same culture as the Europeans and the Americans. I don't see any belonging.. Growing up, Asian people have got this togetherness … white people don't have in their own families let alone in their communities. (Yacoub, Youth worker, Newtown Youth group) 

***
As we used to walk home there's like many white people area we used to get called racist abuse like you terrorist and all this.. go back to Afghanistan and all this and we aren't even from Afghanistan (Hamid, leyton)  

A range of themes are suggested by the above comments. First, at the local level of schooling and in their local environments, the boys reported a significant increase in anti-Muslim racism whether experienced through name calling dissociation or physical attack. However, the boys suggested that the events of September 11 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ had not produced any significant new experience – rather it had aggravated, intensified existing tensions and re-racialised them.  As Shahid’s account suggests, before September 11 ‘it was bad, but not that bad’. The main new factor was the intensity of namecalling. Whereas in the past, boys had routinely been called   ‘Paki’, they reported that terms such as Afghani, terrorist, and suicide bomber had been added to the usual repertoire of racist insults.  In addition to name-calling, boys expressed an increased sense of stigmatisation as a result of being judged to be associated with Islamic terrorism.  

A second theme related to the construction of polarised ‘us and them’ identities. That  is,  the boys drew specifically on Muslim ‘we’ identities which were constructed in relation to a collective ‘they’ composed of ‘whites’, ‘Europeans’, ‘Americans’ sometimes collapsed into a single entity  and at other times referenced interchangeably .   This concurs with the findings of recent empirical studies on second and third generation British south Asians which note an increasing tendency among British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to assert Muslim identities (Werbner, 1996, Eade, 1990; 1994;   Samad 1998; Saeed et al, 1999, Archer, 2003; Ramji 2007).   Collectively ‘they’ at one level, were imbued with the power to judge Muslims in collusion with a powerful and highly partial media that also represented imperial interests.  However, drawing on notions of community and family, the boys subverted these dominant readings by suggesting that Muslim and Asian family forms were stronger and less individualistic than white, English forms, reversing cultural pathology argument. Yacoub, used it after a recounting a catalogue of direct and indirect abuse that had been thrown at him in recent months. Zahid, cited below, also made reference to differentiated forms of family reversing usual culturally pathology arguments to suggest that white/English/European family forms lack the solidarity of Muslim and Asian family forms:    

To mix in with the English you need to be very different,  like in our culture we don't move from our parents’ house until we're married and we've got kids of our own but they move out when they're eighteen. But then we're not like that because we respect out parents much more than these people. We take care of them. English parents are always in the homes and you never see an Asian Pakistani or an India, everybody, just like their parents to live with them.(Zahid)

In Zahid ’s account, superior family and cultural forms are inclusive of Indians though elsewhere some of the boys were keen to draw out dscintinctions between Indians and Pakistani and Bangladeshis. While Yacoub suggested that  they lack the ‘togetherness’ that Asian families own, Zahid and they ‘don’t look after their own’ (Zahid). Archer also found the boys in her study constructed themselves and their family norms as superior to western and white family forms and cultural practices (see also Archer 2003). 

Thirdly,  as in young people’s recounts of the Paris Banlieues disturbances in 2005 (Cesari, 2007), scathing references were made to the role of the media  in the perpetuation of racist discourses about Muslims and in the engineering of moral panics about Muslims. The Communities and Local Government Department (2009) also found that most Muslim communities in Britain share this perception of the media as ‘anti-Muslim’. In my own research, an all powerful media was constructed as partial and strongly aligned to American, British and European imperial interests. This reading of imperialist media practice was also mediated by their local experiences of media in Oldwych.  which often reported stories about Muslims in negative and sensationalised way. For example, stories often began with sentences such as, ‘here we go again, Muslims have managed to...’ suggesting that Muslims received favouritism by the local council or event that they were attempted to impose sharia law in the local area. 

You know that’s the media, they twist everything ...it’s always the white people who turn out to be good guys. Like in the films the Asians and that are always the bad.  Whether it’s Asian black, Chinese, they’re still like that. It’s always the Americans that are good. (Asad)
***
Media is bad news. You know because at the end of the day who's running the media? Americans and all the British and they're the ones that hate Muslims. And at the end of the day, Muslims are going to take over one time and they ain't gonna like it. They'll come in numbers. (Arshad, Newtown)
***
Zahid:It was just like all everything was going bonkers basically. Like everyone was talking about it and taking the wrong idea because it was not the English people's fault it was the media's fault because they give the wrong idea to the public (Zahid) 

 The   above accounts   reveal  strong suggestions that white people, mainly working classes who were in there area  are the cultural dupes of the media ‘ whatever they’re fed by the press’ Yacoub  said earlier. Here, Zahid also suggests that  he pities English people implying that they lack the ability to distinguish propaganda from reality. Arshad invokes a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntingdon, 1997) suggesting irreconcilable tensions between Muslims and the West, represented by Americans and the media and Muslims will fight back. I would suggest that assertions of a strong Muslim identity represent a strategic response to counter and resist the widespread stigmatisation and anti-Muslim racism that the boys encountered through schooling and in their local environment post September 11, 2001.  These assertions helped to position the local white working class in as ‘weak’ and lacking in political literacy and therefore to subvert  dominant discourses which positioned Muslims as fundamentally a threat to the britishness nation.
 These strong assertions of Muslim collectivity suggest a take-up of global Islamic identities in the context of talk about international politics and in particular the ‘war on terror’. However, these religious identifications were not fixed and elsewhere the boys reverted to categorisations of themselves and others as Asians for example in the context of talk about national and local polices of cohesion and integration. 
In the context of schooling, a strong collective Asian masculinity cohered around an Asian male peer group that was inclusive of others including other Muslims (namely Turkish and Afghanis) and also white boys and girls. The peer group was constructed externally by a collective experience of stigmatisation (as Newtowners, ethnic minorities, gang members, and sometimes simply as Muslims) . Internally a range  of strategies were employed to gain or refuse membership including the need to demonstrate toughness and machismo but also a community ethos revolving around support and backup of fellow members. 
Racism was a central factor in the formation of the Asian boys’ peer group.  It was also central to the experience of local neighbourhood identities that involved protection of local area for racist attack. However, at the same time as this racialised defence of neighbourhood and school peer group, the boys also invested heavily in their local neighbourhood identities in ways that cross-cut ethnic and religious ties.  For example, the boys were fiercely local in their neighbourhood identifications and engaged in   contestations over highly localised identities as Ashfielders, Belstoners and Newtown. 
Mudasser:  	He comes from Newtown but he moved out to Ryton but he's a bit of an outcast…
Nasim: and he was born in Afghanistan weren’t you?
Avtar Brah's observations about the local cultures inhabited by Muslim youth are particularly useful to refer to here:
The lived cultures than young  Muslim[s] .. inhabit are highly differentiated according to such factors as country of origin, rural/urban background prior to migration, regional and linguistic background in the subcontinent, class position in the subcontinent as well as in Britain, and regional location in Britain.  British Asian cultures are not simply a carry over from the (country of origin) . . . Hence Asian cultures of London may be distinguished from their counterparts in Birmingham.   Similarly, east London cultures have distinctive features as compared with those from west London.  (Brah,  1993:448-9)
In line with Brah’s  analysis,  Oldwych masculinities were distinct in that they were embedded in or articulated with local histories.   One aspect of this related to the boys’ location in Newtown which like neighbouring Belstone hosted the majority of the ethnic minority population.   Historically there had been rivalries between white working class youth in Belstone and Newtown that were  carried over and  racialised   as minority (mainly Muslim) youth have taken up  residence in those white working class areas. As the excerpt below illustrates, this involves struggles over territory with not only white youth but also with other Muslim Asian boys:

The only common factor was that we're Muslim …But the differences [in perception between the youth of both neighbourhoods] were.. Right, from Belstone…'The thing about Newtown is that they all dress like niggers'. Newtown, 'The thing about Belstone is that they're all well-behind.. proper typical Pakis'  so this is what these are labelling theories that come from the European side …We call it area-ism. (Yacoub: Youth worker) 

The boys from Newtown drew a distinction between their own brand of street culture (which intersected with an indeed borrowed and adapted  'black' or African-Caribbean definitions of street culture, styles of dress and musical identifications - eg the emphasis on having the right labels, listening to rap) and other Asian boys who by comparison were negated for displaying what the Newtown boys read as a more 'towny' masculinity that reflects an engagement with more traditional ideas of what is fashionable (eg   Bollywood style with  loud shirts and tight jeans  and more traditional forms of music).  
 Masculine rivalries between Asian boys took on many forms but were most commonly contested through football, 

We play five a side in tournaments but we the thing is you know what the problem is with the …it’s a territorial thing.  Newtown v Belstone…
 
In relation to their interactions with white working class youth the boys drew on particular expressions of masculinity with the emphasis as in the account below  on  sporting prowess.  
	
See the thing was.. When we went there, they (white boys) weren't better than us in table tennis, they weren't better than us in pool and when we played football against them they thought they thought they were better than us but then we proved 'em wrong.    	And we beat 'em at that, that just topped it off that just put the cherry on the cake.
Girls played a significant role in these masculine rivalries. However, where  white girls were commonly referenced in relation to struggles and competition with white boys, Asian girls were relationally constructed as out of bounds:  
See the thing was.. When we went there, they (white boys) weren't better than us in table tennis, they weren't better than us in pool and when we played football against them they thought they thought they were better than us but then we proved 'em wrong.    And we beat 'em at that, that just topped it off that just put the cherry on the cake.  (Arshad, Newtown)
 ***
  We would talk to the girls but the boys wouldn't talk to us and they didn't like it that we were talking to their girls and Tariq was doing something naughty with one of 'em so [FS: So, what happened?] It all kicked off didn’t it?
(Nadim:Newtown)

Ramji (2007) argues that Muslim young men in her study  saw white girls as ‘easy’ and relationships with them were pursued as a way of ‘getting one over’ on  white boys. Dating   a Sikh or Hindu girl was seen as the ultimate way of ‘getting one over on an old adversary’. There were few Sikh and Hindu and girls in Newtown but white girls were commonly cited   as symbols of masculinity in competitive racialised fight talk. In group interviews boys were more likely to construct girls in highly sexualised terms, again as part of group bonding but in individual interviews, boys often talked in less objectivised ways about white girls as part of their friendship groups, as long term girlfriends and even as part of their imagined futures as potential  partners (see chapter seven).  In the context of local inter masculine rivalries,  its seemed, if Yacoub’s account is to be believed, that Asian boys had become the ‘new black’ (Alexander, 2000).  

The young kids a treated as foreigners so they're seen as different. So they're seen as something else. The young girls then, are looking for their kicks and so they're heading for the Asian lads and white lads don't like stuff like that because they’ve again become European and territorial about their girls and suddenly they care about them. So it causes a whole range of everyday realities for the Asian lads. (Yacoub:Newtown)
Yacoub suggests here that one of the consequences of being stigmatised as ‘bad boys’ is that the new found sense of danger is also highly attractive to white girls. White girls then, collude in the production of this hegemonic form of racialised masculinity (Connell, 2005). Yacoub’s account positions white girls as agentic if predatory (they head for the boys), but denies agency to the boys at the same time (who are targeted and have no choice but to consent). At the same time it positions girls as symbols of masculinity or as markers of racialised boundaries  (Anthias an  Yuval Davis, 1992) in masculine struggles over territory and turf. 
Yacoub’s account also invokes colonial fears about interracial mixing due to the need to preserve ethnic purity (Ware, 1992). These fears were re-worked in the context of the Notting hill   and Nottingham riots in the 1960s when newspaper reports mentioned as a cause of the violence, the sight of a white women walking with a black man. Such fears resurfaced through media representations of rape crimes involving Asian  men and through German  ex banker Thilo Sarrazin’s  tenuous connections between the restrictions of Islamic culture and the apparent tendency for Turkish Muslim youth in Germany to target white women. (Kreikenbaum, 2010) 
At the same time as white girls were constructed as ‘available’, Again girls were relationally constructed as ‘out of bounds’:    
FS:	But you don’t mind..other people talking about girls
Sajid:	No not really my mate Hussein there he might go out with a girl [laughs]
FS:	Would you?
Sajid:	I've been out a few girls 
FS:	Are they English or Pakistani?
Sajid:	English, and  I won’t go with Pakistanis because end of the day you know the brothers…..[laughs] you get beat up. It's not worth it [laughs] 
(Leyton)

Asian girls were mostly referenced through a discourse of protection. For example, certain areas were considered ‘too dangerous’ for them to be in – though it could be suggested that such discourse also helped to legitimate boys’ occupation of public use of public space and the discursive construction of the home as a safe, space, that is, to defend patriarchal privilege.
Aziz:	Over Stupid things like I  don’t know why ....if we’re just standing there and just glance at somebody  they you know how boys are …Over a stupid thing like that a minor thing like that  or when someone swears at somebody  or they swear at  Asian girls or cussing them.
FS: So you stick up for other people?
Aziz: I stick up for anybody ..white, Asian, i got a lot of white friends ...i stick up for them  My friends  are white boys and Asian boys but if someone cusses my sisters friends or  Asian girls then I get a bit offended  they’re like my sisters   init. I get offended  .. a minor thing like that    (Leyton)
In constructing white girls as acceptable girlfriends, they simultaneously constructed Asian girls as out of bounds and through this, themselves as protectors of Asian femininity. Through appropriating the discourse of protection, however, the boys denied agency to Asian girls.  These constructions are interesting when compared with the views of Asian and Muslim girls (Shain 2003). This research found that Asian girls often castigated Asian boys for their relationships with white girls, suggesting it was part of their incorporation into dominant white culture. Asian girls were not passive but also extremely willing and able to fight their own battles (ibid) . 

Conclusions
I have argued that contrary to dominant policy and political debates which read Muslim youth exclusively through the lens of culture and religion, their experiences are shaped by complex intersections of ‘race’ class and gender in  articulation with local geographies and histories. 
I also hope that the data drawn on in this chapters, while fairly small-scale and in no way generalisable, illustrates some of the complexities and the varied nature of the contemporary forms of racism that shape the experiences of Muslim youth  in England. The current focus on the supposed radicalisation of Muslim youth is significant for understanding the ways in which Muslim youth are currently  positioned as the victims of 'backward' Muslim cultures, with boys being assumed to be constantly in danger of being brainwashed into radicalism and girls   being both the victims and symbols these repressive cultures. The accounts of  Muslims boys referred to in this challenge these dominant discourses on Muslim masculinity and illustrate the range of factors that shape their experiences of schooling and their social and political identifications. While it is undoubtedly true the politicisation of religion has had an impact in terms for bringing Muslim identities to the fore in certain contexts, in the local struggles engaged in by Muslim youth, a range of other preoccupations are also significant in shaping identities. These include various struggles over schooling, masculinity and femininity, over territory etc that are played out in the context of their local class cultures.  
 

Notes
 The  Satanic Verses  controversy  began in 1988 with the publication of a novel in which the author Salman Rushdie explored  themes of cultural alienation, racism and the role of religion. The strong opposition to the book was based upon the thin line it drew between fact and fiction. Rushdie cast doubts on the authenticity of the Quoran, implying that parts of it were the work of the devil. It was in England, and particularly in Bradford, that the strongest reaction to the book was manifest. Although the first book burning was held in Bolton in December 1988, when 7,000 people staged a demonstration, the greatest publicity and condemnation was directed at the famous book burning in Bradford in January 1989.  On   February 14th 1989, a  fatwa was issued, by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran leading to a dramatic turn in events. Demonstrations were staged in many parts of the world but the participation of young Asian men in Bradford grabbed the attention of observers and social analysts. 
2 This research is reported more fully in Shain (2011)
3 For example, the headscarf controversy in France in 1989 when 3 schoolgirls were sent home from school for wearing the hijab sparking a major controversy about the relationship between Islam and the secular values institutionalised in the French state.  
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